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A crude provision of the Act, justifiably attacked by the major-
ity, was the delegation of power to certain producers and mine work-
ers authorizing them to fix wages and hours. In the light of Panama
Oil Refining Co. v. Ryan "I and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,'7 the provision was a display of poor judgment and policy.
The delegation was to a body, not impartial, but consisting of mem-
bers having conflicting interests with few defined standards to guide
its action.' 8 Conceding this weakness in the Act, the decision as a
whole, nevertheless, is unfortunate for its sweeping assertion of
"fundamental principles" which if applied literally will predestine
most future social legislation to death at inception.
T.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-VALIDATION OF THE
NEW YORK UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAw.-Complainant at
Special Term sought a declaratory judgment nullifying the Unem-
ployment Insurance Law of New York I as unconstitutional and
wholly void under both federal and state constitutions.2 In acquies-
cing to complainant's request the question whether complainant was
" Panama Oil Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
" Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837
(1935).-
1 Note (1931) 31 MicH. L. REV. 786 (delegation of federal legislative power
to executive or administrative agencies) ; Note (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 798;
Baesler, A Suggested Classification of the Decisions on Delegation of Legisla-
tive Power (1935) 15 B. U. L. REV. 507.
'N. Y. LABOR LAW (1936) §§ 502-531. In general its main features em-
brace a 3% payroll tax on all employers who maintain a staff of at least four
persons for a period of thirteen or more calendar weeks of the year in any
employment in which all or the greater part of the work is to be performed
within the state. The assessments will be pooled into a single fund, payments
from which will begin in two years. To entitle an applicant to its benefits,
he must register and subject himself to a three-week waiting period. If he
has had ninety days of employment in the preceding twelve months or one hun-
dred and thirty in the twenty-four months prior to the time his benefits are to
commence, eligibility is his. Any employee whose unemployment was through
his own wrongful conduct or other industrial controversy is penalized an addi-
tional seven weeks waiting period. A recipient of its benefits, who refuses an
offer of employment for which he is fitted, is disqualified provided that accep-
tance would not require him to join a union, or become involved in an indus-
trial dispute, or cause him to travel unreasonable distances or work for a salary
far less than paid in similar work. Payments of benefits are made in the ratio
of one week of benefits for every fifteen days of employment. These pay-
ments shall be made at the rate of fifty per centum of employee's full time
weekly wage but in no event to be more than fifteen dollars per week or less
than five. See Legis. (1935) 10 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 147.2 U. S. CONST. Amend. 14, § 1; N. Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6.
RECENT DECISIONS
deprived of his property without due process of law came direct to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Civil Practice Act.3 Held, the
legislature faced with the widespread distress of unemployment which
affects the body politic can exercise the reserved power of the state
and enact as a practical solution, the New York Unemployment In-
surance Law. Chamberlain v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d)
22 (1936).
The history and development in this country of unemployment
insurance has been brief,4 and since its incorporation into law for
the economic stability of the working class it has received widespread
support. But federal and state courts of late have invalidated sev-
eral statutes which were enacted to improve the general welfare and
to give greater social security.5 This judicial trend as far as the
New York courts are concerned would seem to have undergone a
change since Unemployment Insurance, the most significant advance
since the Workmen's Compensation Law has been sustained. Unfor-
tunate it is that the majority opinion does not analyze and distinguish
cases seemingly contra to the instant case. 6 The Supreme Court of the
United States 7 in declaring unconstitutional a District of Columbia
statute fixing a minimum wage has said "The feature of this statute
which, perhaps more than any other puts upon it the stamp of in-
validity is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for
a purpose and upon a basis having no casual connection with his busi-
ness or the contract or the work the employee engages to do." To
those who harbor the opinion that unregulated industry is not the
cause of unemployment, it must seem that unemployment insurance
is a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of in-
digent persons for whose welfare society and not the employer is re-
sponsible.8 In a recent case, 9 a federal statute compelling railroads
to contribute to a common fund from which payments would be made
to retired railroad employees was held to be unconstitutional. The
constitutional limitations are not to be broken down nor is legislation
to go on unhampered by a finding that the basis for public welfare
laws is in expediency and therefore a valid exercise of the police
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 588, 3.
'See Legis. (1935) 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 147.
'Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918); Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 44 Sup. Ct. 499 (1922); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 393 (1923); United States v.
Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935); Tipaldo v.
Morehead, 270 N. Y. 233, 200 N. E. 799 (1936).
'Railroad Retirement Board et a[. v. The Alton Railroad Co. et al., 295
U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S.
525, 43 Sup. Ct. 393 (1923).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 393 (1923).
'3 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (1936) 139, 147; Chamberlin v.
Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936) Hubbs, J., dissenting opinion.
'Railroad Retirement Board et al. v. The Alton Railroad Co. et al., 295
U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935).
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power.10 It is of no importance how strong the public desire is, ful-
fillment of this doctrine can only be achieved by a constitutional
amendment.:" Opposed to the doctrine espoused by these cases 2
the constitutionality of assessing banks a percentage of their deposits
so as to create a common fund guaranteeing these deposits has found
affirmance in the highest tribunal in the land.' 3 In a similar vein to
force employers to make payments to a pool-fund and to disburse
these funds in compensation for injuries for which the employers are
not at fault has been deemed a valid exercise of the police power.14
Instances of pool-fund contributions are many.' 5 The exigency for
such legislation must exist in a great public need.16 The right to do
so lies in the power of the state to regulate their own domains in
legislating for the public safety, morals and welfare. 17 That the ob-
ject of unemployment insurance is within the reserved power of the
state is unquestionable.' 8 The difficult barrier is whether the statute
is a reasonable approach toward that end and it is with great interest
.that the final outcome is awaited in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
M. McC.
CONTRACT-CONSTRUCTION-INDEFINITE AS TO TIME.-The
plaintiff corporation was granted exclusive right to service all ac-
counts acquired by defendant, a corporation engaged in the business
of soliciting customers who required the extermination of vermin.
"°Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 210 U. S. 393, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 158 (1922).
'Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 210 U. S. 393, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 158
(1922).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 393 (1923);
Railroad Retirement Board et al. v. The Alton Railroad Co. et aL, 295 U. S.
330, 55 Sup. Ct. 765 (1935).
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
"Hawkins v. Bleakly et al., 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1916) ; New
York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1916);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1916).
"Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247 (1884); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 225 (1916) ; Hawkins v. Bleakly et at., 243 U. S.
210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1916); New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 343
U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1916) ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1916); Dayton-Goose Greek Co. v. U. S., 263
U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1924); R. R. Retirement Board et al. v. Alton R.
Co. et al., 295 U. S. 495. 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935) ; U. S. v. Butler. 3 U. S. Law
Week 373, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936) ; State v. Cassidy, 32 Minn. 312 (1875).
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
'House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 282. 31 Sup. Ct. 234 (1911).
" Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Suprene Court (1927)
40 HARv. L. Ray. 943; Legis. (1935) 10 ST. Jon,'s L. Ray. 147, 155; 3 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (1936) 138.
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